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Chapter 5*

CENTRALIZATION AND THE
TRANSFORMAHON OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION

In 1892 John D. Rockefeller founded the University of Chicago and made
William Rainey Harper its president. Two years later, in 1894, the Chi
cago Civic Federation selected Harper the first chairman of its educational
committee; the same year, the federation nominated Harper for appoint
ment to the board of education. Two years later. Mayor Swift appointed
him. Then, in January 1898, following representations from businessmen.
Progressive reformers, and the Civic Federation, Harrison created a blueribbon Educational Commission to investigate and report on the state of
public education in Chicago. Members of the commission then chose
Harper as chairman.'
Exactly one year later, the commission reported to the mayor, rec
ommending “radical” reform of the “largely defective” administrative
structure of public education in Chicago. In particular, the commission
found that the administrative structure, with its “large” board of 21 mem
bers and 17 committees inefficient, subject to graft and corruption, and
prone to unwarranted political influence or “pull.” The commission rec
ommended that the board be reduced from 21 to ii members; that board
members continue to be appointed by the mayor rather than popularly
elected; that administrative and legislative functions be clearly differen
tiated, with the administrative functions exercised by a highly paid super
intendent acting as an educational “expert” with greatly enhanced powers
and a six-year contract, and a business manager who would have “a free*Coauthored with Marjorie Murphy.
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dom similar to that of the executive head in any well-conducted business
enterprise.” The superintendent alone would determine the course of
study, hire all teachers, determine “efficiency,” and recommend promo
tions. The commission concluded that “the established laws of business
cannot be violated with impunity in the management of the professional
details of our schools.
Prominent national educational figures praised the commission’s re
port, but to the fledgling Chicago Teacher’s Federation (CTF), formed
two years prior to protect teachers’ pensions, raise salaries, and to “study
parliamentary law,” the Harper Report boded ill tidings.’ The commission
had included no teachers, women, or labor figures; it had not consulted
teachers; it had made no provision for tenure; it had recommended that
the process of teacher training and certification be revised to include a
college education; and although it had recommended creating a system of
teacher councils, they were to be advisory only and to have no say in the
design of school policy or in the administration of the school system.
When Harper engineered the appointment of Benjamin Andrews, a men
tor of Harper’s at Denison University, to the superintendency, and sup
ported through the good offices of the leading expression of political
progressivism in Chicago, the Civic Federation, a bill in the state legisla
ture to institute the recommendations of the commission, the CTF feared
that the material welfare and professional autonomy of Chicago’s teachers
stood in jeopardy. The union quickly mobilized to contest Harper and the
Civic Federation in Springfield. The battle lines between business and the
“administrative progressives,” as David Tyack calls them, and the CTF
were drawn, and remained so throughout the next three decades.'’
At an immediate political level, three issues pitted the business com
munity, the board of education, and the administrative progressives
against the CTF: (i) business domination of the board, (2) imposition of
a centralized and hierarchical administration modeled upon corporate in
dustry and nourished by the same ideological developments that nour
ished political progressivism generally, and (3) the teachers’ conditions of
employment. The conflicts generated by these differences were often char
acterized by sharp expressions of class consciousness and antagonism, but
the origins, character, and significance of these conflicts cannot be ade
quately captured in terms of a simple categorical notion of “class politics.”
Rather, the origins and significance of the centralization movement de
rived from the common vision of class relations and institutional align
ments shared by progressives in education and civic reform and the
complicated relationship between centralization politics and complex pro
cesses of class formation during the Progressive Era.
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The Politics

of

Centralization

When teachers founded the CTF in 1897, they were concerned with bread
and butter issues—above all, salaries and pensions. Indeed, protection of
their pensions against a proposed change in the state law regulating pen
sions for public servants precipitated the establishment of the CTF in
1897.' When the Civic Federation proposed a bill based on the recom
mendations of the Flarper Commission (the Harper Bill) in Springfield in
1899, the concerns of the CTF expanded from pensions and salaries to
include teacher training, job security (entry, promotion, and tenure), and
their professional rights and autonomy. Within a short time the leaders of
the CTF articulated a philosophy of administrative structure and profes
sional autonomy very different from that proposed by the administrative
progressives.
To contest the Harper Bill, the CTF circulated a petition, gathered
fifty' thousand names, enlisted the support of the Chicago Federation of
Labor, and lobbied extensively in Sprin^eld. Margaret Haley, who with
Catharine Goggin was at the time running for election to the top leader
ship positions in the CTF, compared the teachers role under the Harper
Bill with factor)' employees. “The teacher is the only person under the
civil service law who has no right to trial before the Civil Service Com
mission,” she argued. “Every other person from Superintendent to janitor
has that right. We are given no more consideration than factory employees
and our places will be dependent on the good will of the Principal and
Assistant Superintendent.” In terms resonant with the radical republican
idiom of antimonopolism, equal rights, and fear of class privilege, the
CTF warned that if passed, the Harper Bill would give the superintendent
“autocratic powers unknown to the Czar of Russia. The direct relation
ship between the despotic power of Rockefeller—the greatest example of
“one man power in American business”—and the feudal implications of
the Harper Bill should escape no one.'’ Moreover, the Harper Commis
sion’s recommendation that a college degree be made a prerequisite for
entrance into teaching, thereby replacing the old apprenticeship system,
outraged the teachers. Harper had impuned their cultural background
(mainly working class) and their professional competence:
Uncouth and uncultured are terms which they freely apply to the unspecified
element they desire to see eliminated from the schools. What constitutes culture
thev do not define, nor what incompetence. A college degree, however, they would
probably accept as a certificate of culture. With all due respect for a college de
gree—there are many emergencies in the life of the public school teacher where it
would be of considerable less value than the experience she has acquired during
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the four years usually spent in college. . . . To make it a condition of entrance to
teaching or to lower the requirements in favor of those who hold a degree would
be to put a premium on the conventional and the conventional is the last thing to
rely on the problem of dealing with children.'

Teachers were not the only individuals upset. Members of the Chi
cago Central Labor Council argued that “making a college education a
requisite for the position as a teacher” would severely limit the ability of
working-class women to enter teaching, still, around 1900, the principal
avenue of social mobility and respectability for working-class daughters.
The new procedures represented “an unjust discrimination against the
children of the common people who, with few exceptions, find it impos
sible to secure a college education, and who, for this reason, although
qualified in all practical essentials, must give way to the college graduate.”*
Two months later, after Andrews claimed that since schools had to teach
morality, it was necessary that teachers had to be “properly” educated,
another delegate to the Central Labor Council denounced Andrews as a
“moral leper.” “He is the creature of Rockefeller and his purpose is to
promote Rockefeller’s ideas. He talks about outsiders in the schools. The
outsider he refers to is the child of the proletariat.”'’

The combined opposition of the CTF and the CFL blocked passage
of the Harper Bill, much to the chagrin of Superintendent Andrews,
Harper, and the Civic Federation. Andrews blamed the failure of the bill
directly on the teachers “who protect mediocrity and incompetency.” The
CTF, on the other hand, witnessed its membership soar to thirty-three
hundred and confirmation of its political power in Chicago.
Defeated but not intimidated, Andrews decided to pursue the goals
of the Harper Report indirectly, through administrative fiat. In June 1899
he fired a woman music teacher and replaced her with a man as part of a
“reorganization plan” without notifying the school management commit
tee, nominally responsible for such decisions. A week later, Andrews again
irritated the committee when he issued a memorandum requiring a college
degree for admittance to principal examinations, another Harper innova
tion. Immediately, school management committee members argued that
they were not consulted and countermanded the memorandum. Neverthe
less, Andrews was not without friends in higher places, for at the National
Education Association (NEA) meeting that summer, Nicholas Murray
Butler came to the aid of Andrews, angrily denouncing the teachers in
Chicago as “revolutionist” and successfully sponsoring a resolution laud
ing Andrews."
Buoyed by his support at the NEA, in the fall of 1899 Andrews
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continued to implement the recommendations of the Harper Bill through
administrative fiat. He announced that all principals were to make reports
on teachers, noting “their fidelity and consecration,” ability to govern,
books they had read, and personal inquisitiveness. The teachers called it a
police system “like in Russia.”'" In November Andrews proposed a plan
of reorganization that included his own four-year tenure and a salary raise.
The board refused. Andrews then rejected four principals recommended
by the school management committee, and the committee ruled him out
of order." The following day, board president Graham Harris announced
he would accept Andrews’s resignation.'“^ Andrews refused to oblige, and
continued to fight throughout the winter months of 1900 for the reorga
nization of the administrative structure. The board frustrated each effort.
In February newspapers announced that “President Harper, the Civic
Federation and the members of the Superintendents’ Department of the
NBA are about to fire a 13-inch gun in defense of‘one-man power’ in the
Chicago Public Schools.’”' But Andrews had lost his will to fight; in
March he took a vacation and upon his return resigned.

During the search for a new superintendent, the Civic Federation
announced the formation of a Commission of One Hundred to study the
“reorganization” of the school system and set up committees around each
of the major recommendations of the Harper Report. Among others,
Nicholas Murray Butler and Andrew Draper, president of the University
of Illinois, addressed the Commission of One Hundred. Draper, like But
ler, encouraged the federation to pursue administrative reform and to
secure the reduction of the size of tiie school board and the appointment
to it of men “representative of the business and property interests, as well
as of the intelligence and genuine unselfishness of the city.”'" Meanwhile,
the board appointed Edwin Cooley to succeed Andrews."’ Cooley entirely
sympathized with Andrews’s objectives but proved to be far more adroit
politically than his predecessor, actively seeking out the support of leading
board members and the business community while introducing adminis
trative reforms with considerable bureaucratic finesse.
Cooley first concentrated on gaining control over entry into the
teaching force. At the time of his appointment, high school graduates
entered teaching either through an apprenticeship system or through
graduation from a two-year program at the Chicago Normal School (until
1896, the Cook County Normal School). Upon completion of their ap
prenticeship or graduation from the Chicago Normal School, local school
committees of the board of education hired the teacher for a local neigh
borhood school, very often the same neighborhood the teacher had grown
up in, a situation highly suited to patronage politics and local control of
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neighborhood schools.'* Shortly after his appointment, Cooley acted to
overturn the existing system and locate control of the hiring process in the
superintendent’s office. At the beginning of the new school year, Cooley
convinced a member of the board to introduce an “anti-puli’ regulation to
prevent political influence in the hiring of teachers. In November the
board approved the regulation. Under the provisions of the new rule,
Cooley drew up a list of all personnel appointments and submitted it as a
whole to the school management committee in June. Should any board
member, alderman, or political person discuss with Cooley any individual
teacher, Cooley would expose both the lobbyist and the teacher, placing
that person on the ineligible list.'"
Next, Cooley turned to the system of promotions. At the time, prin
cipals and local school committees controlled the promotions process^
primarily they evaluated teachers for their ability to govern and to teach.
When a financial crisis hit the school system in late 1901, Cooley took the
opportunity to announce the introduction of a “new promotional scheme”
and “merit pay system” in which salaries were tied to secret “efficiency
grades” or “ratings.” “Efficiency grades,” in turn, were to be measured in
terms of professional attainments, systematic work and results in scholar
ship, and “school interest”—cooperation with other teachers and with the
principal as determined by the principal. Efficiency grades determined
whether a teacher could then take a promotional examination to gain a
salary^ increase. Erom these evaluations a teacher was graded from 95 to
100 as “superior,” 90 to 94 as “excellent,” 80 to 89 as “good,” 70 to 79
as fair, and below 70 as incompetent. The grades were kept secret “to
avoid comparisons and to avoid political ^^pull.” The teachers were never
notified of their exact grade and if they had attained above 80, they were
simply told they were eligible to take a promotional examination. “The
merit system,” Cooley claimed in unconscious irony, “will make teachers
progressive, not time serv'ers.”“
With the antipull campaign in full swing and the new promotions
scheme in place, Cooley turned to the transfer system. Normally, teachers
transferred on the basis of seniority with the approval of the local school
committee and the district superintendent. Cooley decided to “base trans
fers according to ‘merit’ ” and the “needs of the entire system.” Teachers
had no court of appeal; those who appealed to their district superinten
dent, to board members, or their alderman Cooley accused of using pull."'
The CTE reacted with immediate hostility to Cooley’s proposals. The
“efficiency ratings” failed “to take into account the qualities of soul and
heart and mind, the really vital part, the character and personality of the
teacher” and threatened to undermine collective solidarity. The new trans-
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fer system, on the other hand, would destroy the ability of teachers to
teach in the school of their choice, often in neighborhoods where they
had grown up. The CTF leadership decided to boycott Cooley’s propos
als but the membership split: While many teachers would boycott the
system, others felt they could not afford to, a simation that created consid
erable conflict and “bitterness” among the teachers, and ineffective oppo
sition. Not until 1905, with the appointment of the first Dunne board
and the selection of Jane Addams to head the school management com
mittee, did the teachers get their first real chance to force Cooley to retract
his promotions scheme.^’
Cooley’s antipull crusade and his new promotions and merit pay
scheme won him immediate prestige and invitations to speak at the Mer
chants Club, the Commercial Club, the Union League Club, and the Civic
Federation, a prestige he used in mrn to ftirther centralize power in the
superintendent’s office.’’ He engineered the reduction of the number of
board committees, organized along district lines, from more than sixty to
four on a city wide basis: school management, buildings and grounds
finance, and compulsory education. In a series of moves, he gained control
of the appointment of Normal School faculty, the admission of smdents
and the general policy of the Normal School. To destroy the power of
local superintendents and centralize power m his office, in 1902 Cooley
reduced the number of district superintendents from fourteen to six, sig
nificantly reduced their powers (e.g., over transfers, curriculum, and text
books) created three new assistant superintendents in the head office to
oversee day-to-day administration, and formed the six remaining district
superintendents into an at-large board of superintendents. The next year,
he codified the rules of the board of education, carefhlly delineating the
prerogatives of the board and inserting those prerogatives of the superintendency outlined in the Harper Bill although not approved by the state
legislamre. He began to refine cost per smdent categories in his annual
reports, and in 1904 started publishing the Chicago Board of Education
Bulletin. The contents of the Bulletin accurately reflected the more prosaic
preoccupations of the administrative progressives: average school mem
bership total cost of educational supplies, and average cost per pupil of
supplies including chalk, crayons, erasers, drawing paper, arithmetic pa
per, spelling paper, language paper, unruled paper, pencils, pens, an
penholders The Bulletin listed these calculations by school so principals
could compare their cost-effectiveness in issuing supplies to that of other
schools. It also included curriculum outlines, suggested reading lists, and
recommended smdy lists for teachers preparing for exarns, aiming to
achieve uniformity throughout the system. Pleased with the success of
Cooley’s efforts to achieve efficiency and economy, the board put aside its

Centralization and Transformation ofPublic Education

201

financial worries momentarily to vote him a five-year contract and a
$10,000 per annum salary.^
Yet for all his success in securing administrative centralization,
Cooley remained discontented: He also wanted legislative endorsement of
what he had accomplished covertly through bureaucratic fiat. In 1901 the
Civic Federation, with the support of Cooley and board member Clayton
Mark, a Chicago businessman and later head of the Commercial Club’s
educational committee, sponsored legislation in the Illinois legislature
proposing further reforms along the lines advocated by the Harper Re
port. But opposition lead by the CTF defeated the bill. Undeterred, the
Civic Federation in 1903 supported another bill to increase the power of
the superintendent to enable him to control appointment, promotion, and
firing of teachers, to determine the course of study, and to reduce the size
of the board from twenty-one to nine members. At the same time, Cooley
and Mark supported a bill similar to the Civic Federation’s, except that
the Cooley-Mark Bill did not stipulate any particular size for the school
board. Both bills were designed to give legal sanction to what Cooley had
already accomplished.^'
The state legislature refused to pass either bill, again due to the ener
getic opposition of the CTF and the Chicago Federation of Labor. The
Civic Federation’s bill, Margaret Haley claimed, “is fundamentally wrong
because it creates an administrative officer and confers on him all the
duties and powers namrally and necessarily inherent in the whole teaching
force, and the people, through their representatives, thereby setting aside
the principles of democracy in the internal administration of schools, pre
cisely as the same principles are set aside in the government of the schools,
so far as the whole people of Chicago are concerned. . .
To Haley, the
bill expressed a nationwide antidemocratic sentiment:
The situation in Chicago as far as the relation of the teacher to the system is
concerned, is not peculiar to Chicago, but is general throughout the country. The
tendency in the field of education today is the same as the tendency in the com
mercial, the financial and the political world—that of concentration of power in
one man or one set of men. This centralization of power has the effect of bringing
the top captains of the world with untold power for good or ill to those under
them and to those dependent on them.*’

But the bill threatened more than democratic principles and the profes
sional autonomy of teachers. It also attacked their material security:
The whole bill is a denial of the rights of the rank and file, whether they be teacher
or people. Teachers who have not only spent years in professional training, but
have devoted their lives to the actual work of teaching, who are in fact the real
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educators of the children, have no security of tenure ot office or salary except that
which the will of one man assures, and no more voice m the educational system ot
which they are a part than the children they teach.”*
Contesting the Civic Federation’s bills in Springfield represented only
part of the CTF’s efforts to protect democracy and the material interests
of teachers. In 1900 and 1902 the union committed teachers to two
unusual and controversial steps that challenged the board even further. In
1900 the CTF filed a tax suit against corporate tax evaders, and two years
later it affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor.
In the wake of a threatened salary cut in late 1899, Margaret Haley
instigated an investigation of the Cook County tax system. She found that
several hundred corporations had avoided paying city taxes. She per
suaded the CTF to file suit against the tax delinquent firms in the hope of
increasing the revenues of the board of education and the salaries of its
teachers. Five public utility corporations alone owed taxes of $2,358,295The courts decided in favor of the CTF in May 1901; in October the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the decision. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S.
District Court; the court upheld the decision but reduced the sum to
$600,000. In 1903-04, the delinquent corporations paid the sum to Cook
County, which, in turn, passed the money on to the Chicago Board of
Education. But in a quite remarkable display of arrogance and callousness,
the board, rather than paying the increases in teachers’ salaries it had
promised years before, decided to pay the coal bill, reinstitute kindergar
tens, give the janitors a raise, and contribute money to the building fund.
The board then added insult to injury by introducing the Cooley merit
pay” scheme. Their material needs denied and their professional compe
tence impuned, the members of the CTF voted to affiliate with the Chi
cago Federation of Labor.*’
Haley justified affiliation as necessary to protect the material welfare
of the teachers as wage earners and the need to join forces with those
organizations struggling for a better education and democracy in America.
“Two ideals are struggling for supremacy in American life today, she
argued “one the industrial ideal, dominating through the supremacy of
commercialism, which subordinates the worker to the product and the
machine; the other, the ideal of democracy, the ideal of educators, which
places humanity above all machines, and demands that all activity shall be
the expression of life.” Because of the growing dominance of the industrial
ideal and “the increased tendency toward Tactoryizing education,’ making
the teacher an automaton, a mere factory hand, whose duty is to carry out
mechanically and unquestionably the ideas and orders of those clothed
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with the authority of position, and who may or may not know the needs
of the children or how to minister to them,” teachers needed to affiliate
with organized labor. Affiliation offered a means through which teachers
could “rid themselves of the reactionary conditions in and out of the
classroom which are crushing out their lives and that of the children.”
Through organization and cooperation the teachers could “save the
schools for democracy and save democracy in the schools.”’°
Affiliation with the CFL proved to be a bitter pill for a number of
teachers, who resigned from the CTF in protest. But the dissatisfaction
did not hinder the growing involvement of the leadership of the CTF in a
number of reform movements, particularly municipal ownership and
women’s suffrage, both of which Ffaley and Goggin identified with the
expansion of democracy in America." The same year (1902) the CTF
affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor, it joined the Illinois
Federation of Womens Clubs. Affiliation with the two organizations pro
vided the necessary ingredients for a strategy of coordinated reform en
compassing labor, teachers, and women, representing the factory, the
school, and the home for the pursuit of social reform. While labor would
“improve the standard of living of the poorest and weakest members of
society” and democratize industry, and women would protect the integrity
of the home and the nation through the ballot, teachers would fight to
protect the material interests of teachers and to extend “democracy in the
schools.”” Haley’s hopes for the alliance appeared well founded, at least
in the short run. During the 1905-07 debates over a new charter for
Chicago, the CTF, the CFL, and the women’s organizations combined to
help defeat the educational provisions of the charter prepared by the Mer
chants Club and Theodore Robinson of the Commercial Club that pro
posed the selective appointment of school boards and administrative
centralization. The CFL, for example, attacked the educational articles of
the charter as an effort to transform public schools into “a cog in the
capitalistic machine, so that . . . children reach manhood’s estate content
in a condition of abject servitude.” There could be no other reason for
centralized and autocratic authority, declared the CFL, than to impart a
“reactionary mold to the minds” of fumre workers. Control of the school
board and administrative centralization went hand in hand with control
ling the content, pedagogy, and function of public education.”
Meanwhile, in early 1904 the CTF brought a suit against the board
for the board’s failure to increase teacher salaries with funds derived from
the successful tax evasion suit; in August 1904 Judge Edward F. Dunne
decided against the board and for the teachers. The following year, the
CTF energetically supported Dunne’s successful bid to become mayor of
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Chicago. Dunne responded by appointing seven new board members
friendly to the CTF and, according to Jane Addams, “for the most part
adherents to the new education”: Jane Addams herself; Cornelia DeBey,
a physician and child labor reformer; John Harding, business agent for
the Chicago Typographical Union; Mrs. Emmons Blaine, the widowed
daughter of Cyrus McCormick; Emil Ritter, a manual training teacher
and president of the Referendum League; and two others to represent the
Polish and Jewish ethnic groups in the city.*^
In one of the board’s first acts, it appointed Ella Flagg Young, an
ardent advocate of democratic decentralized administration and teacher
councils, to the principalship of the Chicago Normal School. Addams
secured appointment to the chairmanship of the powerful school manage
ment committee, a role she believed would enable her to mediate between
Cooley’s “commercialistic” administration and Haley’s CTF, since the
“whole situation between the superintendent supported by the majority
of the board, and the Teachers’ Federation had become an epitome of the
struggle between efficiency and democracc^; on the one side a well-inten
tioned expression of the bureaucracy necessary in a large svstem but which
under pressure had become unnecessarily self-assertive, and on the other
side a fairly militant demand for self-government made in the name of
freedom.”"
It was not long, however, before Addams and Haley came to a painful
parting of the ways. In May 1906 a dispute arose as to whether the
teachers who had borne the cost of the tax fight should be the only ones
to receive a salary increase. The CTF and Addams divided; Addams sug
gested that the CTF was “self-seeking.” But what ultimately forced the
issue was Addams’s failure to allow the CTF to petition the board against
implementation of the Cooley promotional system. Addams thought that
Cooley’s proposals would be of “undoubted benefit” and proceeded to
find a compromise with Cooley: Cooley could keep his promotional
scheme if he would allow teachers to substitute course work for the pro
motional examination. Cooley accepted. Haley was appalled and described
the affair as “one of her keenest disappointments” and a sign that Addams
had “compromised her principles.” Haley decided to give up on Ad
dams—who had become known as a “strong” supporter of Cooley—and
to wait for seven more Dunne appointments before mounting a campaign
to dismantle the Cooley administrative structure.’'’
Dunne made seven new appointments in July 1906. Uniformly sym
pathetic to the vision of democratic administration sponsored by the CTF,
the new members, particularly Ritter, Post, and DeBey, systematically
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attacked the administrative philosophy of the centralizers. Ritter com
plained that former boards of education had been dominated by business
men who had run “the schools on the factory plan.”’’ Post criticized the
“spoilsmen” and the “business” board, denounced the “commercialistic
ideal of the system,” the replacement by the “ethics of the counting room”
of “democratic tendencies and educational ideals,” “high salaries for ad
ministrators with low salaries for teaching,” and the “conception of au
thoritative sequence” based on a docile board of directors, a dictatorial
superintendent, department managers, bureau chiefs, and a body of teach
ers responsive as a vast mechanism, like factory workers, to orders trans
mitted from above. Post ticked off the despotic character of the
administrative system under Cooley’s aegis—“the absurdly aristocratic
marking methods, . . . the arbitrary salary-promotional device, . . . the
silencing of the teaching body”—and decried “the irresponsible control
which the Superintendent has over examinations for entrance, salary pro
motion and functional promotion,” the “atmosphere of secrecy in which
the system is immersed,” and “the demand that the Superintendent be
allowed complete control, either without supervision or under a Board
with little other power than to register his decrees.” Finally, Post found
fault with Addams’s compromise promotions and salary scheme of the
previous year: “The recent modifications of the promotional test appear
to have been introduced by way of compromise at a time when the Chi
cago Teachers’ Federation was urging the abolition of promotional ex
aminations,” he argued. “While not open to some of the objections urged
against the examinations, this test is equally objectionable as to its pur
pose, which is to create arbitrary conditions for salary advancement.”
Instead, he recommended a new policy including strict probationary re
quirements for new teachers, a board of three examiners to conduct en
trance examinations, that all teachers graded by their principals as
“efficient” per se advance through the salary schedule on an annual basis,
semiannual reports of principals on each teacher, and that teachers have
time off to attend classes at the Normal School.’*
Cornelia DeBey added her voice to the chorus of criticism. Calling
attention to the writings of John Dewey, Ella Flagg Young, and Albert
Hart, DeBey decried the “despotic manipulation” of teachers by the
“masterhands” and the hierarchical “methods of management. . . from the
top downward.” She proposed instead a new system of management that
worked “from the bottom upward”: the teaching force should have “ad
visory authority and responsibility on educational subjects and the relation
of the teaching body to the school system,” while the superintendent
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should have “administrative authority and advisory direction.” DeBey also
recommended that teachers be organized at the local, district, and central
levels.”
. .
The broadsides against the philosophy of centralized administration
provided the intellectual justification to dismantle the system of central
ized administration desired by the reformers. The board repealed the
Dawes antipull rule, altered the promotions scheme, dropped the previous
board’s appeal to the state supreme court in the tax case, raised teacher
salaries, debated the Post and DeBey reports, increased the membership
of the board of superintendents from six to ten, appointed women to the
four new district superintendent positions, voted to make decisions in
teacher transfers, changed textbooks to include teacher choices in spellers
and union-printed textbooks, and, finally, reorganized administration into
a decentralized structure that included district councils with teacher representatives."^° For the moment, at least, “democracy” had triumphed over
“efficiency.”
Partisans of business control and centralized authority did not, how
ever, take all this lying down. Throughout the life of the Dunne board,
the Daily News and the Chicago Tribune kept up an unremitting barrage of
invective that was at times as inventive as it was vicious: “Freaks, cranks,
monomaniacs and boodlers,” the Tribune called the reformers. Jane Addams commented that “the newspapers had so constantly reflected and
intensified the ideals of a business Board” that “from the beginning, any
attempt the new Board made to discuss educational matters only excited
their derision and contempt.”-^' At the same time, Chicago’s leading busi
nessmen continued their campaign to extend administrative centralization.
Declaring that the schools should be run on a “rational and business-like
basis,” the Merchants Club, through the good offices of Cooley, brought
Nicholas Murray Butler back to Chicago to define once again the goals of
the efficiency movement and to rally the faithful. Butler ridiculed the idea
of teacher councils for he would “as soon as think of talking about the
democratization of the treatment of appendicitis” as to allow “the democ
ratization of schools.” For Butler, “democracy is a principle of govern
ment; and a democracy is as much entitled as a monarchy to have its
business well done.” He concluded—to great applause—that if he were a
board member he would do his “best to have adopted a by-law which
would remove from the school service any teacher who affiliates . . . with
a labor organization.”'*"

In the 1907 mayoral race, the Republican candidate, Fred Busse,
defeated Dunne and installed a “business” board as he had promised.*’
The new board, dominated, wrote Jane Addams, by men “representing
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the leading Commercial Club of the city,” immediately went about dis
mantling the work of the previous board and reactivating the centraliza
tion program. In a symbolic gesture of class consciousness, the board
renamed the Henry George School the George Pullman School."^ The
board also supported legislation, drawn up by members Theodore Rob
inson (vice-president of Illinois Steel, chairman of the education commit
tee of the Commercial Club, and a leading advocate of charter revision
and vocational education), to vest executive authority in the hands of a
tenured superintendent and to reduce the size of the school board to
fifteen members. The bill, however, went down to defeat, again largely
due to the intense lobbying of the CTF and the CFL. Frustrated, Cooley
resigned his position in March 1909, exclaiming as he did that no school
reorganization program would be successful so long as the CTF existed."^*
Although a final showdown between the business-dominated board
and the CTF appeared imminent, in a surprise move the board appointed
Ella Flagg Young superintendent to succeed Cooley. Young’s administra
tive philosophy, articulated as a student of John Dewey’s at the University
of Chicago and published in 1901, was almost an antipode of Cooley’s.
Where Cooley desired to centralize power in the superintendent’s office.
Young preferred a system of decentralized administration that gave teach
ers a significant role through a system of teacher councils. Mrs. Young
acknowledged the increasing size and complexity of urban school systems
but did not view centralization and bureaucratization as their inevitable
concommitants. Indeed, Mrs. Young argued, centralization and bureau
cratization were undemocratic and un-American: “No more un-American
or dangerous solution of the difficulties in maintaining a high degree of
efficiency in the teaching corps of a large school system can be attempted
than that which is effected by what is termed ‘close supervision.’ ” Power
should be decentralized and decisions implemented through a federal sys
tem of teachers’ councils ascending from the individuals’ schools to dis
tricts to a central council. The councils would consider policy proposals
and make recommendations; the superintendent would act according to
her judgment but she would “be held responsible for the outcome.”^'’
Discerning the motives of the board’s members who appointed Mrs.
Young can only be guesswork. Perhaps they wished to lower the level of
political conflict between the CTF and the superintendent’s office; perhaps
they imagined that the appointment of Mrs. Young would facilitate the
implementation of a differentiated vocational curriculum. Mrs. Young,
after all, strongly supported vocational education, and Theodore Robin
son, a leading member of the board, was a major figure in the vocational
education movement. In any event, the appointment of Mrs. Young cer-
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tainly reduced the level of conflict between the CTF and the office as Mrs.
Young adopted policies near and dear to the hearts of the CTF member
ship. She reduced classroom size, eliminated the secret marking system,
modified the Cooley promotional plan, supported increased salaries, intro
duced teachers’ councils, and consulted teachers on the selection of text
books and curriculum development. As might be expected, the CTF
thought very highly of Mrs. Young.-’" The relationship between Mrs.
Young and the board proved far less cordial, however, particularly after
Mrs. Young publicly opposed the Cooley Bill in the state legislation in
1913.^* When she also refhsed to go along with the requests of two board
members, William Rothmann and Jacob Loeb, to demote teachers who
were leaders of the CTF or who opposed the efforts of Rothmann to gain
control of the teachers’ pension hind, relations between Young and the
board deteriorated even further.-’’' In an intriguing move, wholly inconsis
tent with the philosophy of administrative centralization but accurately
reflecting the concerns of the board with curriculum matters, the board
voted to remove control over the course of study from the superinten
dent’s office.'" Twice in 1913 Mrs. Young resigned her position (the
second time the board split evenly on her reappointment), only to be
reinstated by the board following widespread protests and pressure from
Mayor Harrison."
Meanwhile, tensions between the CTF and the board also accelerated
steadily. In 1912 and 1913 Harrison appointed several members—Roth
mann, a lawyer, and Loeb, a real estate and insurance agent—intent on
destroying the federation and gaining control of the teachers’ pension
fund. In 1913 the CTF secured the defeat in the state legislature of a
board-sponsored bill designed to increase board control of its pension
fund.” In 1913 and 1915 the CTF led the opposition against the boardsupported Cooley Bill. Thwarted by the CTF, Loeb bided his time. He
eventually succeeded following a fiscal crisis in early 1915, the creation by
the board of a committee of “efficiency and economy” to devise ways to
lower costs (the committee recommended in May that teacher salaries be
cut 7'/^%), the election of William Hale Thompson to the mayor’s office
in April 1915, the creation of a state commission (the Baldwin Commis
sion) to investigate the board and the CTF (an investigation probably
intended to be a CTF witch hunt), and the effort by a CTF sympathizer
in the Chicago council to investigate the financial records of the board of
education.” On August 23, 1915, Loeb introduced a motion into the
board committee meeting that denied the teachers the right to belong to
any organization affiliated with trade unions or having paid business
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agents. On September i the full board adopted the motion by eleven to
nine.-*^
The Loeb Rule provides a classic example—indeed one of the first in
American history—of the application of the open shop philosophy to
public employees. As in the battles between labor and capital, the issue
centered on control of the workplace, but with one important difference:
The rhetoric of “professionalism” and “service” replaced the “harmony of
interests” doctrine of industrial life. “Teaching is not a trade, it is a profes
sion, and one of the noblest professions,” explained Loeb. “In principle
and in practice, trade unionism is inconsistent with and unnecessary to a
professional career. In the schools it makes for a divided allegiance, it
breeds suspicion and discontent. It destroys harmony and creates strife. It
interferes with discipline and halts efficiency.”” The CTF was “a curse to
the school system,” its leaders “lady labor sluggers.”’* “We’ve got to stop
this unionization of teachers once and for all. It has gone far enough.
These unions are growing like fire. They are taking over the schools and
turning labor on us. We will cut them off from labor. We’ll cut their
professional throats if we have to.””
Nine days after the adoption of the Loeb Rule, the Chicago Federa
tion of Labor called a mass protest meeting at the Auditorium Theater.
Samuel Gompers and Louis Post, now assistant secretary of labor, came
from Washington to speak. For Post, the Loeb Rule represented yet an
other effort by business to turn schools into factories by reducing teachers
into factorylike workers. Alderman John Kennedy declared that business
men and their representative, Jacob Loeb, wished to transform the school
system “from a system of education for the development of the child, to a
system to prepare the raw material for their factories and their shops and
their mines and their stores. . . .” John Walker of the Illinois State Feder
ation of Labor (ISFL) compared “the difference between school teachers
who are free and untrammeled and independent, who have the right to
act towards the school system as their biowledge of it and judgement
leads them to believe is right, and, on the other hand, school teachers who
will be held in the hollow of the hands of the direct representatives of the
business interests.”'* The ILSF and CFL sent letters of protest to the
governor of Illinois, denouncing the Loeb Rule as an effort by “big busi
ness” to have the schools “create for them a body of trained, efficient, and
somewhat servile workers” while providing “the cheapest possible sort of
education.””' Margaret Haley linked the “determination of ‘Big Business’
to reduce the teachers to a state of servility” to the ongoing struggle
between democracy and monopoly:
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The attack upon the teachers of Chicago . . . reveals the dearest ambition of the
financial feudal lords of America who have agreed upon one economic and poi'tic
principle that looks to the control of the Public School system in the country^ T
motive is simple. Profits are being reduced by a growing
Democraev demands that this control shall become more powerful
The selfish interest of the wealth classes depends upon the breaking down of the
popular power, therefore, your fight for life is as profound and as precious as the
early struggles of the men who founded this nation.“
On September 23 the CTF obtained an injunction against the en
forcement of the Loeb Rule on the grounds that it was too sweeping^ In
response, the board on September 29 amended the rule to read “member
ship in some teachers organizations which have officers, business agents or
other representatives of the teaching force.- The courts held, however,
that no action could be taken until June 1916 when the teachers would be
up for reelection. In June Loeb, now president of the board, dismissed
siW-eight teachers for failure to comply with the Loeb Rule (wentyeight were federation members, including all eight of its officers). A storm
of protest broke upon the board."" On July 17, i9i6, a public meeting,
chaired by Mary McDowell, addressed by Janes Addams, Charles Merriam and Helen Hefferan of the Women’s City Club and president of the
Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers and provided with a statement
prepared in part by Victor Olander and John Fitzpatrick, condemned the
firings and called for the creation of a new citizens association."' Shortly
afterward, representatives from twenty-eight civic organizations, along
with Jane Addams, Grace Abbott, George Herbert Mead parks Merriam, John Fitzpatrick, and Victor Olander, founded the Public Education
Association (PEA)."^ Not to be outdone, the Illinois Manufacturers As
sociation (IMA) wrote the school board and Mayor Thompson support
ing the Loeb Rule and created a rival organization, the Public School
League (PSL). Two of the league’s directors were former presidents of
the IMA; its president was president of the Rock Island Mining pmpany.
Declaring that its goal was to “increase educational efficiency, the 1 SL
sought the “entire elimination of the Teachers’ Eederation and its politicolabor activities.”"' Later that year, Loeb joined the PSL.
„ , r
In the early months of 1917, the PEA, the PSL, and Robert Buck o
the Chicago City Council each sponsored a bill in the Illinois legislature
to settle the disputes over administrative structure and control once and
for all."" The PEA-sponsored bill (the Otis Bill) provided for an elevenmember, unpaid, appointed board, three principal administrators (the
superintendent, a business manager, and an attorney), and teacher tenure
after three years’ service. Angus Shannon, the attorney responsible tor
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drawing up the major provisions of the bill, explained to a City Club
audience that the “primary idea” behind the bill “was to place the admin
istrative phase of school affairs in the hands of experts, removed from
political influence, and subject only to the approval or disapproval of a
board of education, in matters of policy. Thus, all details of the actual
work would be in the hands of specialists.”'’" The PEA declared that
among other objectives, the Otis Bill would allow “the board of education
to organize the schools so that they shall employ the most expert people”
while allowing for sufficient “progressiveness” in policy without jeopardiz
ing “efficiency.”'’* Although the bill included no provisions for teacher
councils, increased the powers of the central administration, and provided
for an appointed rather than an elected board, the CTF did not oppose
the bill since it did include a tenure clause for teachers.'’'' On April 20 a
version of the Otis Bill passed the state legislature. After nearly twenty
years of intense battle, the major goals of the original Harper Bill had
been enacted into law. Centralization by statute had at last come to
Chicago.
The very same day that the Otis Law passed, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in a decision that Ella Flagg Young called the “Dred Scott Decision
of Education,” decided that “the board has the absolute right to decline
to employ or re-employ any applicant for any reasons or for no reason at
all. . . .” Elated, Loeb exclaimed that it was “the happiest day in my
life,. . . there will be no more labor unions in the public schools.” De
feated, the CTF disaffiliated with the CEL, the ISFL, the AFT (founded
the year before in Chicago with the CTF as Local No. i) and the Women’s
Trade Union League. The CTF never fully recovered from the blow."°
The sequel to the passage of the Otis Law reveals little more than a
series of comic opera sideshows, including doublecrosses between old
allies, court battles between competing boards of education, hastily ar
ranged marriages of convenience, the wholesale looting of educational
funds on a scale unparalleled even for Chicago, three indifferent and color
less superintendents, a lawsuit by one superintendent against a board of
education, a grand jury investigation, the jailing of several board members
for corruption, and the defeat of Mayor Thompson in 1923."' Under the
circumstances, very little further centralization took place despite the de
moralization of the CTF. When in 1924 a new board appointed a new
superintendent, a disciple of Nicholas Murray Butler, the efficiency
conscious, single-minded, strong-willed William McAndrew, the process
of centralization resumed with a vengeance.
Very little irritated William McAndrew more than “inefficiency,” “lax
standards,” and the usurpation of the superintendent’s autonomy, whether
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by teachers or the board of education. As much as anything else, McAndrew believed in social efficiency, the prerogatives of the superinten
dent, and “close supervision.” He roundly condemned the board of
education’s meddling in the superintendent’s affairs. Referring to the
“tragi-comedy” prior to his appointment, McAndrew traced its source to
“the outworn fallacy that a superintendent is the board’s . . . executive to
carry out their policies. He isn’t. . . . They can’t say what medicines shall
be used or what operations shall be performed. Somebody had to tell ’em
that.”’^ Similarly, McAndrew had no use for the CTF or teacher councils.
In 1927 he informed an audience that he had been brought to Chicago
for the purpose of “loosening the hold of this ‘invisible empire’ within the
schools, a weird system, a selfish system, doing everything to indicate a
selfish purpose and demanding the right to govern the schools.”’’ And
although required by board regulations to call meetings of the teachers’
councils on a regular basis, he either refused to do so or allowed them to
meet only under conditions specified by himself: meetings were not to be
held during school hours, and principals could not be excluded as has
been the custom, since to do so was “repugnant to experience, discipline
and efficiency.” The system of teachers’ councils, he argued, violated the
principles of “the standard works on school management in which there
is a direct line of control from Board through superintendent and principal
down to teacher. . . .” Teachers required not autonomy but “close super
vision.’”*
McAndrew’s regime of “close supervision” introduced a series of re
forms. He required every teacher to check a report sheet four times a day,
established fixed criteria of performance that made no allowance for the
size of classes or children’s backgrounds, and introduced standardized tests
and a system of “line and staflP’ supervision to ensure strict compliance.
McAndrew’s “Official Notice on Teacher Efficiency” for 1925-26 con
tained little that was different from Cooley’s original scheme. Knowledge
of subject accounted for 10 percent; teaching ability 20 percent; progress
of pupils JO percent; cooperation with pupils and community 10 percent;
cooperation in school management 15 percent; professional standing and
growth (including adaptability to suggestion for professional improve
ment) 15 percent. Finally, an open-ended category for “demerits” allowed
a principal for any reason at all to take off as many points as he wished.
McAndrew informed principals that they had “the iron hand” and should
use it.”
Although McAndrew flatly opposed eftbrts by politicians, business
men, or teachers to dictate educational policy to the superintendent’s
office, he was by no means hostile to businessmen or to their interests.
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McAndrew insisted on a “100 percent mastery program” in the basics—
reading, writing, and arithmetic—favored by businessmen and solicited
their opinion on the “efficiency” of the schools by sending out letters to
members of the Association of Commerce under the heading “Customers’
Estimate of Service.” McAndrew did not send similar letters to leaders of
the labor movement or to the parents sending their children to school.’®
In May 1926 McAndrew organized the first of a series of “Citizens’ Sam
pling Days” to demonstrate to the school system’s “stockholders”—rep
resentatives from leading civic organizations—the quality of the schools’
“human output” and the degree to which the “human output” satisfied
the “requirements” of the stockholders. On the appointed day, represen
tatives from business firms, the Chicago Association of Commerce, the
Union League Club, the City Club, the Women’s City Club, the Chicago
Bar Association, the settlement movement, and other organizations plied
the children with questions and tests of skill.” For one invited citizen
stockholder who did not attend, John Fitzpatrick of the CFL, there could
be no doubting the meaning of “Citizens Sampling Day.”
I cannot understand what you and your assistants are thinking about when you
talk about ‘output customers. Stockholders and Sampling Day’ unless you imagine
that you are running some kind of a mill or factory while you are grinding out a
certain kind of product or material and you are going to get the ‘stockholders and
customers’ together and bring forth ‘samples’ as an exhibit of your ‘output.’
. . . Thus ‘sampling day,’ as you present it, is nothing more or less than an
exhibition of the effort and result of eight years’ schooling to make the youngsters
think and act alike. . . . And the customers will be shown that the products of our
public schools jump when the string is pulled, and they will be splendid material
to draw upon for employees in stores, offices, shops, factories, or elsewhere.
The parents are not consulted as to whether or not they are satisfied with the
kind of schooling their children are getting. But why should they be consulted?
The schools are not being run for them but for the ‘stockholders and customers.’’*
The following year, 1927, the voters of Chicago reelected William
Flail Thompson as mayor of Chicago. During his campaign, Thompson,
perhaps wishing to establish his presence in international affairs before
running for the office of president of the United States, attacked
McAndrew for allowing “pro-British” books into the schools and prom
ised to “punch King George in the snoot.” After his election, Thompson
promptly engineered a “trial” of McAndrew by the board and
McAndrew’s dismissal.”' In a symbolic parting of the ways, the CTF and
the CFL supported Thompson, while the Joint Committee on Public
School Affairs, an umbrella organization of twenty-nine civic organiza
tions and aging Progressive reformers, supported McAndrew.*'’ Yet, al-
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though Thompson dismissed McAndrew, the dismissal did nothing to
undo the centralization of educational administration or to roll back the
business-oriented ideology of social efficiency that dominated the admin
istration and curriculum of Chicago’s public schools. McAndrew’s demise
did not presage an assault on centralization or on the ideology of social
efficiency. McAndrew went, but centralization stayed; Thompson won,
but social efficiency prevailed.

Centralization, Business,

and

Progressive Politics

Between 1899 and the mid-i920s, a coalition of school superintendents
and businessmen, with the occasional support of other Progressives, man
aged to secure, through a combination of administrative fiat and legislative
statute, the major recommendation of the Harper Report of 1899: “radi
cal” reform of the “largely defective” administrative structure of public
education in Chicago. The victory of this coalition raises three general
questions: first, the character and significance of their victory; second, the
nature of the coalition that achieved it—the relationship between the
administrative progressives, the business community, and Progressive re
form generally; and third, the character of the opposition that centraliza
tion generated.
The phenomenology of success is readily apparent. The coalition
succeeded in securing the reduction in the size of the school board, the
appointment rather than the election of school board members, and the
nonremuneration of members. Board members had been appointed rather
than elected prior to the Progressive Era, and they had not been remuner
ated for their services either, but in light of the demands ot the CTF and
the CFL for the election and payment of school board members, the
continued appointment and nonpayment of school board members should
count as victories for the reform coalition. The net effect of the reforms is
also not difficult to discern. Although businessmen were highly overrepre
sented on the board prior to 1899, after 1900 they dominated it, with the
sole exception of the Dunne board between 1905 and 1907. George
Counts, in his study of school politics in Chicago, reveals that all 120
members of the board he studied between 1903 ^nd 1926 were drawn
entirely from the middle and favored classes. . . . The Chicago Board of
Education has been composed almost exclusively of persons engaged in
proprietorial, managerial, professional, and commercial occupations
lawyers, physicians, corporation presidents, manufacturers, merchants.
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publishers, real estate agents, bankers, architects, contractors, insurance
agents, and dentists.” Moreover, after the formation of the Association of
Commerce in 1904, the association had, on average, three or four mem
bers serving on the board at any one time; during the first three years of
McAndrews’s administration, five of the eleven members were members
of the Association of Commerce.*'
In addition, the coalition drastically altered the administrative struc
ture of public education in the decades after 1899: It secured the clear
differentiation of legislative and administrative functions, and it imposed
a hierarchically organized structure of authority, modeled on corporate
industry, that located centralized power over the teaching force, the edu
cational process, and the day-to-day operation of the school system in the
superintendent’s office. Cooley’s “anti-pull” rule and his “promotional
scheme” secured centralized control over the hiring, promotions, and sal
aries of teachers; other reforms secured centralized control over their train
ing as well, while Loeb’s Rule severely hampered the ability of the CTF
to wield political power over the board or resist the superintendent’s will.
Although McAndrews failed to wrest control of the day-to-day operation
of the school system from the local school management committees,
Cooley succeeded. Securing control over the educational process proved a
more complicated task. The organizational strucmre of the educational
process—the fact that teachers taught in self-contained classrooms free
from direct supervision of principals, and with some immunity from the
imposition of more technical forms of control characteristic of industrial
work processes—limited the ability of the superintendent’s office to gain
control over the educational process.*" Nevertheless, the administrative
progressives succeeded in securing as much control over the educational
process as its organizational structure would permit. Each superintendent,
but above all McAndrew with his regime of “close supervision” and con
stant measurement, increased the control of the superintendent’s office
over grading standards, student promotional policies, textbook selection,
and pedagogical methods—the bureaucratization of pedagogical practices
described in chapter 2. Finally, the superintendent’s office exercised mo
nopoly powers over the course of study, although for a brief period during
Ella Flagg Young’s incumbency the board removed authority over the
course of study from her office. In effect, centralized control over the dayto-day operation of the school system, over teachers, and—within the
limits imposed by the classroom system—over the educational process
represented the successful imposition of a hierarchical structure of social
relations and the creation of what Willard Waller described as a “punish-
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ment-centered bureaucracy” in which superintendents exercised “dominative” authority over teachers, an educational version of the shift from
formal to real subordination characteristic of corporate industry.*’
Two groups could fairly claim responsibility for the success of the
centralization movement; businessmen and their organizations, and an
ambitious but clearsighted cadre of aspiring professional educational ad
ministrators who, with one exception, occupied the superintendent s office
between 1899 and 1927—Harper, Andrew, Cooley, and McAndrew. Of
the two groups, the administrative progressives were far more committed
in principle to centralization. Indeed, there are ample grounds for believ
ing that many of the businessmen who supported centralization did so not
because they supported educational centralization as a matter of principle
but because they wished to engage in various forms of petty accumulationist activity or pursue an open shop campaign. Membership on the board,
support for centralization, and opposition to the CTF were far from one
and the same thing.
Chicago’s administrative progressives pursued centralization for a va
riety of reasons, although not because they were forced to, as Raymond
Callahan suggests. Callahan argues that educational administrators advo
cated centralization for purely defensive reasons: by virtue of the “vulner
ability” of their positions to business-dominated boards of education,
administrators adopted the ideology of social efficiency and pursued cen
tralization to protect their jobs.*"’ This does not seem to have been the
case in Chicago. True, businessmen dominated the board of education
and superintendents served at the pleasure of the board. But the businessdominated board of education did not impose the ideology of social effi
ciency or the particular model of centralized and hierarchical administra
tion on a recalcitrant Edwin Cooley or an unwilling William McAndrew.
Both men viewed themselves as apostles of the new order. Both whole
heartedly, even passionately, believed in social efficiency and centraliza
tion, proselytized on its behalf, and attempted, against bitter opposition
from the CTF and the CFL, to advance the cause of one and institution
alize the other. The explanation of the adoption of social efficiency doc
trines and centralization by the administrative progressives lies elsewhere
than in the “vulnerability” of their positions.
In part, the centralized and hierarchical bureaucratic structure that
the administrative progressives and their business allies imposed reflected
a response to a genuine crisis of financial solvency and administrative
coordination associated with the rapid expansion of the school system in
the years after 1890. But problems of coordination and financial solvency
can explain only part of the popularity of the corporate model of admin-
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istration. Administrative coordination can be achieved through a variety
of administrative structures: the administrative progressives sought not
just coordination but centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic control.*’ The
administrative problems facing the administrative progressives were real
enough, but the administrative structure they imposed expressed a partic
ular political construction of administration—the assumption, shared with
other followers of administrative progressivism writ large, that administra
tive efficiency necessitated a centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic ad
ministration characteristic of corporate industry. The fact that the board
frequently turned a blind eye toward corporate tax evasions and low prop
erty assessments, that it sold prime inner city land to resolve immediate
fiscal problems, and that it leased valuable school land at a fraction of its
real value to major corporations in Chicago only exacerbated the prob
lem.*'’ Moreover, administrative progressives, like their ideological com
patriots in civic reform, were intensely leary of machine politics and imag
ined that a clear separation between legislative and administrative func
tions, and the centralization of educational decision-making in the super
intendent’s office, would limit the capacity of “politics” to corrupt the
administrative process. Again, the fledgling science of educational admin
istration developing at Stanford, Columbia, and Chicago lauded the cor
porate model for its efficiency, economy, and parsimony.*- Finally, insofar
as educational centralization promised to create a profession at once pow
erful, respected, and remunerative, it provided a means of advancing the
claims of meritocratic expertise as a legitimate form—and source—of so
cial authority and secured the “collective mobility” of an aspiring profes
sional group of educational administrators. In a word, centralization was
part and parcel of a process of class formation—the making of the profes
sional middle class.**
The administrative progressives did not succeed alone and unaided.
Indeed, businessmen, business organizations, and a business-dominated
political reform organization (the Civic Federation) aided and abetted
them in important ways. The Civic Federation sponsored Harper’s en
trance into public school politics when it nominated him for the board of
education in 1894, supported the formation of the Harper Commission
in 1898, sponsored the Harper Bill three times in the state legislature, in
1899, in 1901, and again in 1903, and created the Commission of One
Hundred to advance the cause of centralization; the business-dominated
board gave unwavering support: to the efforts of Andrews, Cooley, and
McAndrew to centralize educational administration; representatives from
the Merchants’ Club and the Commercial Club drew up the education
provisions of the revised city charter in 1905—07; Clayton Mark of the
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Commercial Club collaborated with Edwin Cooley in drawing up another
bill submitted to the state legislamre in 190;; Theodore Robinson, also
of the Commercial Club, assumed responsibility for drafting another ver
Sion of the Harper Bill in 1909; Jacob Loeb broke the affiliation of ffie
CTF with the CEL; the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association created the
Public School League in 1916 to support Loeb’s efforts to dismember, as
'^Tut although businessmen dominated the board during the period
when it imposed centralized administration, and although they assumed
major responsibility for securing legislation sanctioning centralization, for
the most part, businessmen supported centralization, or what is not quite
the same ffiing, opposed the CTF, for very different
*a" ^
motivating the efforts of the administrative progressives. In general, rela
tively few businessmen were seriously interested in centralization per se,
and Len fewer supported centralization because they were
committed, as a matter of principle, to centralization. Indeed, while re
form of the conditions of board membership helped consolidate business
domination of the board of education, it is fairly clear that in part business
domination of the board did not so much reflect business preoccupation
with principles of social efficiency and centralized administration but a
belief among many businessmen that board membership represented
opportunity^o engage m one form or another of petty accumulation.
Some like William Rothmann, for example, were little more than greedy
avaricious opportunists interested in tapping the revenues of the board
(or the teachers’ pension fund) to line their own pockets, or they wished
io punish, hobble" and, if possible, destoy the CTF for its efforts to^e
public utilities, a major newspaper (the Tnbune), and several dozen large
Lrporations (including Pullman and Armour) for tax evasion, ‘ow prop
el assessments, and the leasing of valuable school board property to
bSinessmen for a fraction of its market value. For such businessmen,
centralization, or opposition to the CTF, were matters of immediate eco
nomic gain, not political principle. On occasion some businessmen sup
ported centralization or opposed the CTF as a matter of principR: The
businessmen associated with the Merchants’ Club who drew up jdu
cational provisions of the proposed city charter
^05-07 were better
government” businessmen interested in keeping school costs and, t
fore taxes to a minimum as a matter of economic principle, while Jacob
Loeb and the members of the PSL who battled the CTF
anti-union, open shop ideologists committed to the destruction of the
CTF and the labor movement generally.

Yet, not all businessmen supported centralization or opposed th
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CTF simply because board membership provided an opportunity to en
gage in petty accumulationist activity or indulge in open shop demagog
uery or to keep taxes low. Some, at least, had a broader view. The very
same Civic Federation that sponsored Harper and then the Harper Bills
in 1899, 1901, and 1903, also supported municipal reform through the
Municipal Voters League, whose approach to public administration and
politics differed not a whit from the views of the administrative progres
sives. Both looked askance on the corruption of democratic politics, both
wished to separate as far as possible legislative and administrative func
tions, both endeavored to ensure economy and efficiency in government
and the election of responsible citizens to elective office, and both imposed
a hierarchical and centralized model of governance on public administra
tion. Moreover, individuals and organizations closely linked to the cen
tralization movement were also closely linked to the movement to
vocationalize and differentiate the curricula of public education in Chi
cago. Both Clayton Mark and Theodore Robinson took responsibility for
drafting versions of the Harper Bill and participated in the vocational
education movement. Edwin Cooley advanced the cause of centralization
and vocational education as superintendent between 1901 and 1909, and
after 1910 played a key role in attempting to secure a system of differen
tiated education. Both Mark and Robinson, it will be recalled, were chair
men of the educational committee of the Commercial Club—the very
same organization that sponsored Cooley’s campaign to differentiate the
public school system. In effect, the same individuals, the same organiza
tions, and the same philosophy—social efficiency—guided both central
ization and vocational education to victory. Where one set of reforms
ensured that businessmen formally governed the school system and that
superintendents administered the school system in a businesslike manner
according to businesslike principles, the second transformed schooling
into a business institution, an adjunct to the market economy.
Two groups, businessmen and the administrative progressives, de
serve the bulk of the credit for the success of the centralization movement.
But, on occasion, mainline Progressive reformers also provided important
support. This is particularly apparent in the support of the Harper Bill by
the Civic Federation in 1899, 1901, and 1903, in Jane Addams’s qualified
support for Coole}^s promotional scheme in 1906, the foundation of the
PEA in 1916 by Addams, Merriam, McDowell, Mead, Abbott, and oth
ers, passage of the Otis Bill in 1917, and the support of McAndrew by
the Joint Committee on Public School Affairs in the mid-i92os (when
McAndrew fought to introduce junior high schools, the platoon system,
intelligence testing, and “close supervision,” and fought off political inter-

220

CLASS AND REFORM

ference in the administration of the school system). The fact that Addams,
Merriam, Mead, Abbott, and others protested the Loeb Rule in 1916, or
that Addams supported the affiliation of the CTF with the CFL, did not
represent an ambivalent or limited commitment to centralization; it
merely indicated that they did not identify the cause of centralization with
opposition to the affiliation of the CTF with organized labor.
If support among Progressive reformers for centralization did not
necessarily involve opposition to the CTF, there can be no doubting the
opposition of the CTF itself to centralization. At the time of its founding
in 1897, the concerns of the CTF membership were limited to two issues:
salaries and pensions. At the time, the question of tenure was not a live
issue—Governor Altgeld in 1895 had managed to insert a limited tenure
provision for teachers in the pension law of 1895. Yet within the space of
three and a half years, between January 1899 and mid-1902, a series of
events rapidly expanded the preoccupations of the CTF: the release of the
Harper Report in early 1899, the sponsorship of the first of the Harper
Bills in the state legislature later that year and again in 1901 and 1903 by
the Civic Federation, the appointment of two self-confessed centralizers,
Andrews and Cooley, as superintendents, the refusal of the board to in
crease teacher salaries in 1899 on the grounds of insufficient funds,
Cooley’s “anti-pull” crusade and his introduction of a “new promotional
scheme” and merit pay system in 1901—02, and the refusal of the board
to increase teachers’ salaries in 1901 following the CTF’s court victory in
the tax case. In response to these events, the agenda of the CTF expanded
to include issues involving conditions of entry and promotion, job con
trol, and social reform. That agenda changed little for more than thirteen
years until 1916 when the board’s firing of sixty-eight teachers added
tenure to the list. For almost two decades, the CTF actively pursued the
cause of “democracy in the schools” and “democracy for the schools.” The
former focused on resisting the imposition of “close supervision” and
hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic control within the workplace
while attempting to secure a system of teacher councils, decentralized
control, and professional autonomy, as well as job security. The latter,
“democracy for the schools,” centered on a variety of reform movements
after 1900: tax reform, municipal ownership, antimonopoly, women’s
suffrage, and support for organized labor.
Teacher councils represented the core of the CTF’s campaign for
“democracy in the schools.” Ironically, the Harper Commission first raised
the possibility of a system of teacher councils in 1899, but the commission
intended the councils to be without any formal authority—a mere teaand-biscuits device, not an administrative agency or policy-making body.
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But the influence and writings of Francis Parker, John Dewey, Ella Flagg
Young, and Cornelia DeBey suggested a far more substantial and agree
able system of teacher councils and decentralized administration. Many
teachers, certainly the leadership of the CTF, were thoroughly familiar
with Ella Flagg Young’s Isolation in the Schools, and many had been deeply
influenced by Parker and Dewey, some as students, or through attending
their public lectures and reading their published works. Margaret Haley,
for instance, drew upon Parker and Dewey to explain and justify her
conviction that teachers, by virtue of the great responsibility they assumed
for the training and cultivation of the minds, personalities, and character
of children, required sufficient professional autonomy to be able to re
spond meaningfully to individual student differences and needs and a level
of material security and professional prestige befitting the importance of
their responsibilities:*®
To the teacher it means freedom from care and worry for the material needs of the
present and future—in other words, adequate salary and old age pensions; free
dom to teach the child as an individual and not to deal with children en masse. In
other words, fewer children for each teacher. Last but not least, the teacher must
have recognition in the educational system as an educator. The tendency is to
relegate her to the position of a factory hand, or to the orders from above.

Indeed, teachers found the demand for teacher professionalism
voiced by administrative progressives hypocritical and contradictory. They
dismissed “professionalism as service” as a ploy to keep teachers’ salaries
low. To insist on professionalism while denying teachers control over the
conditions of entry and certification requirements common to other
professions, failing to provide adequate tenure, job security, and salaries,
and refusing to institute a system of councils was sheer hypocrisy. What
else could the teachers conclude of the decision of the Board to refuse to
give teachers time off to attend a public lecture by G. Stanley Hall on the
grounds that the board believed the teachers were not ready for Hall’s
ideas.
Teachers pursued job security, teachers’ councils, decentralized ad
ministration, and professional autonomy under the banner of “democracy
in the schools.” But the quest for democracy also involved a wider political
commitment to the extension of democratic principles to all aspects of
social life. Like John Dewey, the CTF leadership argued that democracy
in the schools could not be separated from—indeed in the long run neces
sitated—democracy in the wider society. Certainly, the fights against tax
evasion by the utility corporations and the leasing arrangements between
the board and several Chicago companies were motivated in part by the
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decision of the board to renege on promised salary increases. But these
struggles also expressed an antimonopoly and equal rights philosophy
with ideological roots in Populism, Greenbackism, and the Knights of
Labor (all of which were part of the political culture of Margaret Haley s
family), and the single tax philosophy of Henry George’s Poverty and
Progress, a book that Margaret Haley had read and described as having
“had a profound effect on me.”-” Again, the support of the CTF for the
municipal ownership movement, like the fight against the “industrial
ideal” and “one-man rule” in education, expressed an antimonopoly and
equal rights sentiment against “money power,” class privilege, and the
“concentration of power in one man or one set of men.”-'" The battle to
elect Dunne mayor of Chicago, and the appointment of the Dunne school
board, particularly Louis Post, a Georgite single taxer, reflected the CTF s
efforts to secure a popularly based school board inspired not by the “in
dustrial ideal” but by democratic principles. Affiliation with the Chicago
Federation of Labor in 1902 represented more than a tactical move by the
CTF to protect the material and professional interests of its membership.
It also represented the commitment of the CTF to broader democratic
political objectives. While the depth of support among the membership of
the CTF for women’s suffrage is unknown, Haley herself worked tirelessly
on its behalf for more than a decade, lecturing, traveling, lobbying, orga
nizing, and answering mail.-”
Finally, in pursuit of “democracy for the schools,” the CTF played a
leading role in founding the American Federation of Teachers in 1916,
and in effecting, between 1903 and 1910, a number of significant reforms
within the National Education Association.-”^ Through adroit political
maneuvering, feminist fellowship and the garnishing of widespread grass
roots support, the CTF fractured the power of the ruling oligarchy (led
by William T. Harris and Nicholas Murray Butler) of the NEA, reformed
selection procedures, elected Ella Elagg Young president in 1910, en
larged the size of the National Council on Education, refocused some of
the NEA’s energies and funds onto questions of teachers’ salaries, pen
sions, and tenure, and secured the creation of the Department of Class
room Teachers.-”
The involvement of the CTF leadership in this broad array ot reform
movements on behalf of democracy for the schools and the protracted
struggle of the CTF to secure professional autonomy and decentralized
administration in the workplace preclude the conclusion, advocated by
some historians, that the goals of the CTF were little more than expres
sions of an economistic philosophy of pure and simple unionism.'”’ Cer-
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tainly the CTF leadership believed that the pursuit of these political objec
tives would enhance the material and professional well-being of teachers,
but their commitment also reflected a larger political commitment to the
extension of democratic social relations in America. Indeed, the politics of
the CTF closely resemble the politics of “reform unionism” characteristic
of the Knights of Labor during the 1880s rather than the narrow economistic policies of “pure and simple” unionism of the 1900s. Like the
unions that flocked to the Knights of Labor, the CTF pursued a program
that combined improved material welfare, job autonomy, and the preser
vation—or restoration—of democratic social relations in America, and
nourished its politics with the traditions of antimonopolism and equal
rights radical republicanism. The CTF did not, admittedly, protest prole
tarianization as the Knights had, but it did protest the threat that the new
training and appointment procedures represented to working-class
women seeking respectability and a measure of economic independence.
Other parallels, besides those of politics and ideology, can also be
found. Some historians of the Knights of Labor (Commons, Perlman, and
Grob, for example) argue that the Knights articulated a “transitional”
“pre-industrial labor consciousness” prior to the triumph of pure and
simple unionism. Similarly, it could be argued (indeed, it is implicit in
Robert Reid’s history of the CTF) that the CTF represents, as it were, a
transitional or pre-professional consciousness prior to the triumph of pure
and simple professionalism (to coin a phrase) and the organizational rev
olution.’- Neither interpretation, however, can withstand close scrutiny.
To describe the consciousness of the Knights of Labor as a form of “pre
industrial labor consciousness” ignores the critique of industrial capitalism
articulated by the Knights and the vision of democratic industrial organi
zation that the Knights proposed. Moreover, the labor historians who
described the Knights as a transitional phenomenon assumed a particular
telos: the inevitable (and laudable) triumph of pure and simple unionism.
But the Knights were not defeated by teleology. Rather, Haymarket, the
shift from formal to real subordination, and the process of working-class
formation—the replacement of the first generation of industrial workers
by the second (largely immigrant) generation and the development of the
labor aristocracy—destroyed the Knights. Likewise, a pre-professional
consciousness did not characterize the CTF; instead, it developed an in
formed critique of centralization, while at the same time articulating an
alternative model of administrative structure and professional autonomy.
Moreover, the defeat of the CTF did not reflect the realization of an
omniscient logic of professionalization or express an immutable bureau-
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cratic imperative toward administrative rationalization. Rather, it reflected
the combined effect of particular and highly contingent political events
and processes. Two of these were particularly significant.
First, the social authority of the ideology of social efficiency and the
political power of the administrative progressives and their business allies
enabled the apostles of centralization to push through a series of reforms
that radically circumscribed the power of the teachers and limited the
ability of the CTF leadership to sustain a militant unionist and radical
political posmre. The board’s adoption of the Loeb Rule in 1916, for
instance, destroyed a major power base of the CTF—affiliation with or
ganized labor—and broke the spirit of the CTF membership, or at least
the spirit of its leadership. The success, moreover, of the administrative
progressives in gaining control of teacher training and appointment en
abled the superintendent to socialize teachers to the new pedagogical and
administrative order and to tie the careers of teachers to the superinten
dent’s office rather than to local district committees. In effect, Cooley
succeeded in breaking the nexus between working-class neighborhood
politics, represented by the local school committee, and control of the
work place—training, appointment, and promotion. Finally, the expan
sion of the school system and the lengthening of job ladders (for women
as well as men) created new job opportunities for ambitious middle-class
college educated women and created a new faction, a labor aristocracy,
within the teaching force—principals, vice-principals, specialists of various
kinds—whose fortunes were closely tied to the new administrative order.
Second, the changing social composition of the teaching force under
mined the capacity of the CTF leadership to foster the growth and matu
ration of a radical working-class organization. During the closing years of
the nineteenth century, the social composition of the teaching force
changed quite dramatically; between 1880 and 1900, for instance, the
percentage of daughters of semi- and unskilled workers in the labor force
dropped from 17.7 percent to 7.9 percent, and the proportion for all bluecollar daughters declined from 47.7 percent to 35.6 percent, while the
percentage of daughters from high white-collar homes increased from
15.4 percent to 27.2 percent. A similar decline characterizes the ethnic
pattern: among immigrant families, the percentage of daughters from
households with one or more foreign-born or semiskilled or unskilled
parents dropped significantly from a high of 22.7 percent in 1880 to 7
percent in moo.”* A noticeable shift in the demographic profile of the
teaching profession thus occurred between 1880 and 1900, the very year
the first cohort of teachers required to have three years of postsecondary
education entered the teaching force, although we do not know whether.
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or to what extent, the latter contributed to the former. There is every
reason to suspect, moreover, that the demographic trend apparent by
1900 continued after 1900. Edwin Cooley had only to pay low wages
(relative to office and factory work) to push the daughters of low whitecollar and blue-collar origins out of a profession in the process of redefi
nition to accommodate middle-class daughters seeking temporary employ
ment before marriage. Expanding opportunities in clercial work attracted
women out of teaching, but the disincentives to stay in education encour
aged the most assertive and militant to give up any ambitions they may
have had in the schools and leave. What had initially been an occupation
of working-class women was still, in 1902, the year the CTF affiliated
with the CEL, dominated by women from a working-class background,
but the writing was on the wall. By the time the board adopted the Loeb
Rule in 1916, the membership of the CTE had probably become predom
inantly middle class in character, and after 1916, middle class in outlook
as pure and simple professionalism replaced reform unionism.
In opposing centralization, the CTF received support from several
sources. It received support from mainline Progressive reformers in 1916
during the crisis over the Loeb Rule, not because Progressives opposed
centralization, but because Progressive reformers were dismayed by
Loeb’s hard line, open shop tactics and confrontational politics. Indeed,
in the aftermath of the Loeb crisis, the organization created by the Pro
gressives, the PEA, worked energetically to secure passage of the Otis Bill,
which gave legislative sanction to centralization. The CTF also received
support from members of the Dunne board, particularly Ritter, Post, and
DeBey. Jane Addams supported the CTF on some issues (e.g., affiliation
with organized labor) but opposed it on others (e.g., with regard to
Cooley’s promotions and merit pay scheme). Ella Flagg Young supported
the right of the CTF to affiliate with the CEL, but more importantly,
supported decentralized administration and teacher councils.
The CTF’s most important and persistent support, however, came
from organized labor, particularly the CEL. The CEL strenuously sup
ported the industrial policies of the CTF to improve conditions of em
ployment and gain a measure of job control through decentralized
administration and teacher councils, but the support of the CEL for the
CTF went far beyond fraternal duty. The CEE’s support also expressed a
deep sympathy to the political orientation and commitments of the CTF—
its efforts to create a democratic education for a democratic society. Like
the leadership of the CTF, the CEL feared that centralization represented
an effort to prevent the democratic control and administration of educa
tion in order to create a class-stratified system of education to serv'e the

226

CLASS AND REFORM

needs of business. Hence, the considerable resiliency and potency of the
factory metaphor in the rhetoric of the CFL (and the CTF) ; their belief
that businessmen and Superintendents Andrews, Cooley, and McAndrew
wanted to create a factorylike education, governed autocratically by busi
nessmen and the superintendent’s office, in which factorylike workers
(teachers) would train in a factorylike manner in specialized production
processes (differentiated curricula) future factory workers.
For a little over a decade and a half, the coalition between the CTF
and the CFL, with the support of the Dunne board and the occasional
support of Progressive reformers, hampered the efforts of the administra
tive progressives to secure centralization through administrative fiat and
blocked passage of legislation imposing centralization. In the long run,
the coalition proved unable to prevent the triumph of centralization.
Its failure strikingly illustrates the character of progressive reform and
the larger social processes associated with America’s Great Transformation
that shaped the reform movement. Essentially the failure of the CTF and
its allies does not so much reflect the inevitable triumph of an organiza
tional imperative as it does the greater political, ideological, and industrial
resources of the administrative progressives, the impact of on-going pro
cesses of class formation and reformation, and the transformation of pub
lic education into a labor market institution. The Loeb Rule destroyed the
CTF as an industrial force, while the slow accretion of centralized power
under Andrews and Cooley and the Otis Bill doomed the vision of decen
tralized power and professional autonomy that the leadership of the CTF
supported. In a sense the imposition of a hierarchical and centralized
system of educational governance, the bureaucratic rationalization of ped
agogical practices, and the day-by-day control of teachers through “close
supervision” constituted an educational version of the shift from formal
to real subordination characteristic of corporate industry. At the same time
the clash between the CTF and the administrative progressives reflected
the impact of processes of class formation and contributed to them in
turn. On the one hand, administrative progressives aspired to advance the
claims of meritocratic expertise as a legitimate source of social authority,
to proselytize on behalf of social efficiency, institutionalize a hierarchical
structure of social relations and administrative arrangements within publiceducation, and create an occupation at once lucrative and prestigious.
Their successes in this enterprise contributed to the making of a nascent
professional middle class. On the other hand, the political conflicts asso
ciated with centralization at first advanced the making of a radical work
ing-class organization practicing a politics of reform unionism. Later, the
Loeb Rule, the changing social composition of the teaching force, and the
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successful redesign of administrative arrangements within public educa
tion stopped this process of working-class formation dead in its tracks. In
effect, the CTF appears to have been both a product and a victim of
processes of class formation.
Finally, the victory of centralization is closely related to the transfor
mation of public education into a labor market institution. Because the
CTF and organized labor opposed not only the Harper Bill but also the
Cooley Bill, not merely the imposition of a corporate model of educational
administration and the formal control of public education by businessmen
but the stratification of the currieulum under the aegis of social efficiency,
opposition to the CTF and support for centralization came to be closely
connected, in terms of ideology and personnel, with the drive to vocationalize and differentiate public education. In short, centralization consoli
dated business control of the board of education, transformed the
administration of the school system along corporate lines, and advanced
the transformation of public education into an adjunct of the market
economy. In the last analysis, the defeat of the CTF symbolized the
triumph of one form of social organization over another: the imposition
of hierarchical social relations and centralized, corporate, and bureaueratic
structures of control on a public institution against the wishes of a radical
reformationist movement protesting the subordination of public educa
tion to the imperious demands of the market and advocating nothing
more revolutionary than democracy in education and an education for
democracy.
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